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‘Ascetic co-operation’: Henry Scott Holland and Gerard Manley Hopkins 
 
On December 29th, 1868, T. H. Green wrote to his twenty-one year old student, Henry Scott 
Holland, concerning the latter’s recent visit to the young Gerard Manley Hopkins at the Jesuit 
novitiate in Roehampton. ‘I am glad that you and Nettleship saw Hopkins’, he began. ‘A step 
such as he has taken, tho’ I can’t quite admit it to be heroic, must needs be painful, and its 
pain should not be aggravated – as it is pretty sure to be – by separation from old friends’. 
Green’s letter, and part of a subsequent longer one on the same topic dated January 9th, 1869, 
has been preserved in Stephen Paget’s memoir of Scott Holland (1921), and although the 
original correspondence has been lost, what remains reveals Green’s feelings of concern over 
Holland’s sympathetic defence of Hopkins. For Holland had written back, admitting a 
‘lurking admiration for Jesuitry’. When ruled by the motive of ‘loyalty to Society’, he had 
argued, ‘beneficent… institutions of ascetic co-operation’ could supply some of the wants of 
the social order. As Paget commented, this answer ‘drew from Green a full statement of his 
thoughts on ἄσκησις, training, discipline’. In the long, troubled letter that followed, Green 
argued that he was indeed in favour of ‘ascetic co-operation’, including its religious forms, 
but that he could not ‘acquiesce in the seclusion’ of ecclesiasticism. Clerical partisanship of 
this type risked separatism and hence failed to take seriously civic duty and political 
obligation. The ‘monastic form’, he argued, ‘does nothing to organise life… It lets the muddy 
tide have its way, and merely picks up a few stones thrown on the shore, which will take the 
saintly polish’. Eight years later, in 1877, Holland would still recall Green’s ‘bitter saying’ 
that Christian priests were content to ‘go into a corner… and polish a pebble or two of our 
own’.1 
                                                     
1 Stephen Paget, Henry Scott Holland: Memoir and Letters (London: John Murray, 1921), pp. 29-32. 
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There has always been a sense that the letters were important. In the original preface 
to the memoir, Stephen Paget had said that ‘he could not get away from them’. They 
contained ‘statements of differences of belief’ that were ‘still worth studying’ even after ‘half 
a century’. They also trespassed on what Paget suggested was a kind of intellectual ‘tragedy’, 
the mental estrangement of Holland from Green and Nettleship. The parting of ways had 
been a difficult one, and, in point of fact, Paget wondered whether they were then (in 1920) 
‘too intimate for publication’. 2 It should be little surprise, then, that the letters have from 
time to time been picked up in academic discussion of Green, Holland, and Hopkins. Re-
reading them today, they still possess an oddly demanding seriousness and urgency; it seems 
there was more at stake than a mere, intellectual disagreement. Of the small amount of 
subsequent literature that makes direct reference to the letters, two essays by Donald 
MacKinnon – essential reading for those studying the philosophical period and personalities 
involved – remain of real importance. The first, ‘Scott Holland and Contemporary Needs’ 
(1952), argued that Holland’s differences to Green had to be taken seriously, for these 
differences had helped inspire Holland to develop a theology that still carried weight in post-
war Britain; the second, ‘Some Aspects of the Treatment of Christianity by the British 
Idealists’ (1984), covered some of the same ground again, but concentrated on criticism of 
the philosophical school when viewed in theological perspective. For MacKinnon, the two 
letters from Green to Holland on the occasion of Holland’s visit to Hopkins at the Jesuit 
novitiate, together with a later correspondence expressing concern over Holland’s own 
ordination as an Anglican priest in 1872, revealed the stresses and pressures affecting Green’s 
relationships with his more orthodox students at Balliol. He took it that these letters provided 
a particularly acute sense of the theological consequence of Green’s influence at Oxford in 
                                                     
2 Paget, Scott Holland, pp. vi-vii. 
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the 1860s and 1870s. But there was more to it than that, for MacKinnon hinted that Green 
was, in Holland’s case especially, more than just a teacher: ‘he was in a strange, perhaps 
unique, sense spiritual director as well’.3 The influence of Green on Holland evidently 
amounted to something more than formal philosophical education, for, according to 
MacKinnon, Green exerted formative pressure on the younger man’s understanding of the 
relationship of Christianity to wider concerns of culture, civilisation, and the political order, 
and, in so doing, provided a framework for his Christian worldview. Green taught Holland of 
the importance of ‘contemporary culture’ broadly conceived, ‘a sense of the world as under 
the providence of God and of the worth of taking seriously its problems and causes’. He gave 
him, said MacKinnon, ‘an attitude towards the world’.4 Yet for all that Green shaped and 
formed Holland’s basic mental outlook, MacKinnon added the suggestion that the letters 
preserved in Paget’s memoir also indicated the extent to which Green failed to persuade his 
more orthodox students. Holland’s calling to Anglican orders was regretted by Green; 
Hopkins’ decision to join the Jesuits perplexed him. The persistence of these Christian 
commitments, that remained irreducible, ineluctable, and resistant to Green’s influence, were, 
in MacKinnon’s analysis, the crux of the matter: ‘between Holland and his master, there is a 
great gulf fixed’, he argued, ‘and in the letters concerned with Hopkins’ resolve to put his life 
at the disposal of the Society of Jesus, the abyss yawns’.5 The persistent irreducibility of the 
Christian claim on Holland and Hopkins was, according to MacKinnon, the point that 
demanded attention. 
                                                     
3 Donald MacKinnon, ‘Scott Holland and Contemporary Needs’ in Borderlands of Theology (New York: J. B. 
Lippincott, 1968), pp. 105-120, here citing p. 105. On Green’s personal relationship with Holland, see further G. 
W. E. Russell’s remarks made in reminiscences dated 1907. According to Russell, ‘T. H. Green… “simply fell 
in love” with his brilliant pupil, and gave him his best’. Russell, Prime Ministers and Some Others (London: T. 
Fisher Unwin, 1918), p. 93. 
4 MacKinnon, ‘Scott Holland’, p. 113. 
5 Donald MacKinnon ‘Some Aspects of the Treatment of Christianity by the British Idealists’ in Themes in 
Theology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1987), pp. 50-68, here citing p. 51 
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For many, of course, interest in the letters is more likely to be focussed on Gerard 
Manley Hopkins than Henry Scott Holland, and this adds an inevitable complexity to the 
present discussion. Green described Holland, Nettleship, and Hopkins as ‘old friends’.6 If the 
letters reveal Green’s perplexity at Hopkins’ decision, and signal his worries that Holland 
might move in a similar direction, they also invite the reader to look again at the mental 
development of Hopkins as priest and poet. Here, a line of theological and philosophical 
enquiry relating to Holland and Green intersects with a line of religious and literary enquiry 
relating to Hopkins. There must be something to be gained by trying to read Holland and 
Hopkins alongside one another, extending insights taken from MacKinnon’s analysis of 
Holland to Hopkins, and using them to provide a deeper understanding of the work of the 
poet.   
MacKinnon’s reading of the letters, though (for theological reasons) perhaps 
necessarily oblique, is, I believe, of critical importance and deserves renewed, careful 
consideration. The (at very least) indirect influence it has had on Geoffrey Hill’s equally 
important analyses of Hopkins must be acknowledged, as should the wider, more diffusive 
influence it has had, via Hill, on at least some recent readings of Hopkins’ poetry. It is not, 
after all, insignificant that when Hill published his influential essay on Hopkins’ development 
and literary dilemmas, ‘“Perplexed Persistence”: the exemplary failure of T. H. Green’ 
(1975), he acknowledged his own indebtedness to MacKinnon’s writing on religious ethics, 
and attentive readers should discern the trace of MacKinnon’s work on Hill’s reading of 
                                                     
6 Paget, Scott Holland, p. 29. For evidence of Hopkins’ friendship with Nettleship, see House and Storey (eds), 
The Journals and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 137; Abbott 
(ed.), The Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins to Robert Bridges, second edition (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1955), p. 18; Abbott (ed.), Further Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins, second edition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1956), pp. 45-46. See further R. B Martin, Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Very Private Life 
(London: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 193-4, p. 362, and p. 375; D. Brown, Hopkins’ Idealism: Philosophy, 
Physics, Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 9. Granted Hopkins’ personal relationship with Nettleship, 
Brown’s work on Hopkins’ intellectual development could be built on to include further reference to Nettleship 
in particular. This is one of the aims of the present study. 
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Hopkins’ relationship to Green. Here, as elsewhere in Hill’s critical writing of this period, 
MacKinnon’s ideas were drawn upon in support of a particular interpretation of what might 
best be called the ethics of Hopkins’ activity as a poet. Thus, to take one example, in his 
inaugural lecture in the University of Leeds, ‘Poetry as “Menace” and “Atonement”’ (1977), 
Hill cited a passage from MacKinnon’s book, The Problem of Metaphysics – a description, to 
be precise, of Kant’s style of ethical writing – and used it to draw out the deliberate 
difficulties of Hopkins’ ‘Not, I’ll not, carrion comfort, Despair, not feast on thee’ as an 
embodiment of the ‘postive virtue of negative statements’.7  What MacKinnon had said of 
Kant in The Problem of Metaphysics, was that the discovery of the ‘authority of conscience’ 
as ‘something thrust upon us’ – of the inescapable ‘unconditional character of moral 
obligation’ as the ‘most inescapable feature of our human existence’ – was something that, in 
Kant’s writing, had been ‘presented through tortuous and strenuous argument’. The 
‘structure’ of this argument, he observed, ‘torments the reader; for it includes at its centre the 
recognition that what we have discovered we can neither represent nor, indeed, rest in 
recognition of its unrepresentability’.8 Hill evidently perceived the significance of 
MacKinnon’s insight into Kantian style, and sensed that Hopkins had come to recognise 
something similar: that the ineluctable demands of conscience should best be spoken of 
tortuously and strenuously. Where Hopkins was tortuous and strenuous, it was because the 
pressure of an imperative demand had been placed upon him, and the nature of that demand 
could not simply, easily, be explained or, indeed, expressed. The difficulty of the demand had 
got into his poetry. The argument was substantial, and capable of changing, one feels, almost 
the entirety of Hill’s approach to Hopkins: this was no mere adjustment of literary 
                                                     
7 Geoffrey Hill, ‘Poetry as “Menace” and “Atonement”’ in The Lords of Limit (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), pp. 1-18, here citing p. 5. 
8 Donald MacKinnon, The Problem of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 66. 
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understanding, but the adoption of a different philosophical perspective on the problems 
Hopkins presents the reader. 
What this means is this: when it came to reading the persistence of Christian 
commitments in the school of Green, MacKinnon had taught Hill the value – the necessity – 
of philosophical difficulty, and Hill had rendered what he learnt from MacKinnon into an 
appreciation of poetic difficulty. The result in the critical work of Hill was the idea that if 
Hopkins could torment the reader, this was because he expected the reader to be attentive; he 
knew this cost patience, but the sacrifice of instant clarity was meant as a type of poetic 
kenosis.9    
This helps explain why Geoffrey Hill understood Gerard Manley Hopkins as priest 
first, poet second.10 When writing ‘“Perplexed Persistence”’, Hill made his debts to 
MacKinnon’s A Study in Ethical Theory explicit, and one senses that the difficulties that 
MacKinnon was attentive to in his discussion of morality and religion lodged in Hill’s mind 
and became his own when writing about Hopkins. 11  Hill had a surer grasp of theological 
issues than some, and behind his analysis MacKinnon’s views were present, altering the 
perception of Hopkins’ style and method.  
What Hill had to say on the matter, therefore, ought to be read with reference to 
MacKinnon, and this means that the crossing network of relationships between Green and 
Holland, and Green and Hopkins, and Holland and Hopkins, deserves attention. In the 
                                                     
9 I owe the phrase ‘poetic kenosis’ to David Mahan’s discussion of Geoffrey Hill and Christian theology. See D. 
C. Mahan, An Unexpected Light (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), pp. 141-98. 
10 See Hill’s complaint in his Ward-Phillips Lectures delivered at the University of Notre Dame in 2000: ‘so 
many readers of Hopkins have… been drawn into the error of regarding him as a wild nature poet of a power to 
rival Keats and Shelley who unfortunately fell among Jesuits and whose gift was consequently repressed. The 
contrary opinion needs here to be stated, that the Spiritual Exercises not only saved Hopkins from repression 
and despair but also gave to his poetry those distinguishing features which set the seal of greatness upon it’. 
Geoffrey Hill, ‘Alienated Majesty: Gerard M. Hopkins’ in Collected Critical Writings (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 518-31, here citing p. 521. 
11 Geoffrey Hill, ‘“Perplexed Persistence”: the exemplary failure of T. H. Green’ in The Lords of Limit (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 104-20. On the debt to MacKinnon, see p. 181, n. 105. 
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following, therefore, the task is to draw out what there is to learn when Holland and Hopkins 
are compared: they both learnt from Green, they both reacted against him and, in the process, 
made their respective commitments to Anglo-Catholicism and Roman Catholicism. Crossing 
between theological, philosophical, and literary analysis, the sermons of Holland and the 
poems and Hopkins need to be read alongside one another. 
 
II 
The problem as Green saw it was that Hopkins’ move meant his separation and 
disengagement from ‘the fully-educated citizen of the European commonwealth’. 
Catholicism, he said, put ‘the incarnate God as a sensual presence in the sacraments’ in the 
place of something more desirable, the ‘moral [presence of God] in the Christian society’. 
But Hopkins had, he thought, now practically deserted that society. The length and the 
earnestness of the letters dated 29th December and 9th January showed the depth of Green’s 
feelings on both Hopkins’ decision and Holland’s sympathy for it. He was at once restless 
and irritated.12 Later, when Holland was called to and chose the Anglo-Catholic priesthood, 
Green reiterated his concern: ‘All that I desire is that you should not become a clerical 
partisan’, he wrote to Holland on December 21st, 1870.13 When Holland was ordained in 
1872, he told Green that his decision was ‘not… anything inconsistent with what I learned 
                                                     
12 Stephen Paget, Scott Holland, pp. 29-32. If Green found the decisions of Hopkins and Holland regrettable and 
perplexing, they thrust Nettleship into turmoil and distress. The selection of letters Nettleship sent Holland 
between 29 July, 1868, and New Year’s Eve, 1872, combine a religious and personal intensity that signifies his 
crisis: ‘It is no good: things cannot be as they have been – though it is like burning one’s tongue to say so’ 
(Paget, 51). Nettleship could not argue himself into belief in the literal meaning of the Gospels: ‘I cannot believe 
these things, Monk, I cannot’ (Paget, 62). The result was this: ‘we cannot die together and we cannot live 
together… you shall be to me the man whom I love… God bless you and keep you’ (Paget, 64). Later, A. C. 
Bradley hinted at the ‘emotional struggle’, the ‘incessant inward struggle’, and the ‘restlessness of unsatisfied 
love’ that haunted Nettleship (Bradley, ‘Biographical Sketch’, in Nettleship, Lectures and Remains, vol. 1, 
(London: Macmillan, 1897), pp. xiii-iv, xxxiv, and lvi). For contextual discussion of the correspondence 
between Nettleship and Holland, see Julia Saville, A Queer Chivalry: The Homoerotic Asceticism of Gerard 
Manley Hopkins (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2000), pp. 32ff.  
13 Paget, Scott Holland, p. 52. 
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from you’. He continued, ‘all the meaning I could put into my theology and certainly my 
ethics was still the old thing. Only, the religious form seemed to me to cap it all, and the cap 
seemed to me to fit’.14 
Yet there was more to it than that. If ecclesiastical separatism offended Green as a 
social theorist, theological realism offended him as an idealist philosopher of religion. 
Green’s fears for Hopkins and Holland were built out of his own critical concerns about the 
future of Christianity. As Green saw it, the time had come for traditional religion to adapt to 
modernity and evolve into something new. The new Christianity would be, in its primary 
essence, moral, not ecclesiastical. So, in the same letters, we find Green spelling out his own 
‘faith [in] the new Christianity’, which, ‘because not claiming to be special or exceptional or 
miraculous, will do more for mankind than… its “Catholic” form… has ever been able to do’. 
Far better, he argued, for the rationally ‘educated conscience’ to speak authoritatively than 
the priests of the Church.15 For all that Green pressed himself on Holland’s mentality, 
Holland (and Hopkins) stood on one side of a religious divide, whilst Green stood on the 
other. For Green, Christianity was an idea, a system of morality. For Hopkins and Holland, in 
contrast, Christianity was real, built upon the revelation of God in Christ. 
In his ‘Essay on Christian Dogma’, Green had sought to transform Christianity into a 
philosophy, and in so doing, had transformed Christ into a moral idea.16  Then, in the first of 
his Lay Sermons, delivered in 1870, he had preached that ‘Christ… is an idea, or form of 
intellectual consciousness’. The event of the crucifixion was primarily the central moment in 
                                                     
14 Paget, Scott Holland, p. 63. As Holland himself was to admit, in terms of mental development, he ‘owed… 
everything to Green’ (Russell, ‘A Final Appreciation’, in C. Cheshire ed., Henry Scott Holland: Some 
Appreciations (London: Wells Gardner, Darton & Co., 1919), pp. 50-51). In later years, the ‘rhetoric’ of many 
of Holland’s sermons continued to be ‘suffused by the ethical and political ideas’ of Green, and there were 
‘continual resonances in his pulpit performance’ to ideas later published in Green’s Principles of Political 
Obligation (MacKinnon ‘Some Aspects if the Treatment of Christianity by the British Idealists’, p. 50). 
15 Paget, p. 32. 
16 T. H. Green, ‘Essay on Christian Dogma’ in Works of Thomas Hill Green, vol. 3, ed. R. L. Nettleship 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888), pp. 161-85, esp. pp. 182-84. 
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the development of this ideal consciousness, ‘the source of a new moral life’. Ultimately, the 
‘immanent God’ and ‘Christ within us’ were ‘mere thoughts of our own’. They were ‘not 
“objective”’. For Green, then, ‘we are left to ourselves’. 17  Such reductionism was impossible 
for Holland. As Edward Lyttelton observed, ‘The fact is [Holland] built up his whole 
interpretation of life… wholly and supremely on the facts mentioned in the Apostles’ Creed, 
taken as true’.18 ‘Green’s etherealized, philosophical conception of the Christian story’ might 
have been ‘attractive to trained thinkers full of appreciation of the powers of human reason’, 
but it was alien to ‘Holland’s grip of the… actual, concrete facts as they have been given’.19 
Likewise, Charles Gore emphasised that, ‘The letters between Holland and Green and R. L. 
Nettleship at the time of Holland’s ordination show that a wide gap existed between Holland 
and the others, and that, however near he came to them in the region of speculation, he was 
not in fact a Hegelian, or a Greenite, or even a pure idealist. He had got a different idea of the 
world’.20 Elsewhere, Gore wrote: 
when a student at Balliol he was largely influenced by T. H. Green, but was never 
enslaved. For Green’s idealism left his pupils with an unhappy feeling that… the real 
thing in itself, knowable, actual, and there present, as a permanent part of solid 
Nature, had been somehow reduced in Green’s argument into an unsubstantial shadow 
in a world where all is mind. But when Holland began to expand his philosophical 
basis in early sermons (published in Logic and Life) he appeared as an emphatic 
realist. It is the objective world of fact that interests him, and in correspondence with 
external reality that he finds the function of the reason… This… was what made him 
                                                     
17 T. H. Green, ‘The Witness of God’, in Works, vol. 3, pp. 230-52, here citing p. 235, p. 233, and p. 244. 
18 Edward Lyttelton, The Mind and Character of Henry Scott Holland (London: Mowbray, 1926), p. iv. 
19 Lyttelton, p. 150.  
20 Charles Gore, ‘Holland’s Philosophy’ in Lyttelton, pp. 199-206, here citing p. 202. 
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at home at once in the theology of the Incarnation, which is the perfect synthesis of 
idea and fact – the Word made flesh.21  
For Holland, Green’s reductionist interpretation offered the idea of redemption, but not the 
reality. Turning to Logic and Life – sermons dating from the latter half of the 1870s and first 
published in the year of Green’s death (1882) – it is easy to see what Gore meant. Here, 
Holland’s concern with sacrifice and suffering was centred on one crucial event, the historical 
death of Christ. 
The more intense our appreciation of the dreadful reality of… sin, the more… needful 
becomes the vision of the Crucified… Here… is no dream, no mocking vision, 
coming with cold and shadowy comfort, to offer its misty thinness for the food of a 
pain-burdened race of worn and suffering men. Here, rather, is a reality, vivid, actual, 
solid, with the vivid solidity of fact. A wounded and bleeding humanity knows what 
to make of a bleeding and wounded God. God’s justification of Himself on the Cross 
plants itself down with a substantial and undeniable plainness, such as makes it at 
home in a world like ours, where evil is actually rending and tearing the flesh of 
men.22 
In Holland’s bleakly realistic meditation on the mystery of evil, the ‘horror’ of the 
Passion of Christ was ‘at least on a level with that which it redeems’.23 Faced with an 
intractable theological problem, he refused to simplify an insuperable question in order to 
arrive at any tidy or conclusive answer; instead, he preached Christ crucified. Reading the 
sermons, MacKinnon’s insight that Holland’s theology was, ultimately, a theologia crucis, is 
justified: as he observed, Holland pointed to ‘the suffering Christ, the revelation of the 
                                                     
21 Charles Gore, ‘Henry Scott Holland as a Theologian’ in Cheshire, ed., Henry Scott Holland: Some 
Appreciations, pp. 35-41, here citing pp. 36-7.  
22 Henry Scott Holland, Logic and Life, second edition (London: Rivingtons, 1883), p. 100. 
23 Ibid., p. 100. 
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Father, as the only key we have to the inner ways of God’. The primacy of the person of 
Christ, crucified, over any other theological or philosophical concern meant that ‘Holland did 
not… speak of the transcendence of God in general terms’; rather, ‘he present[ed] that 
transcendence as something by which we are apprehended in the Crucified’. 24 As Holland 
wrote in the preface to Logic and Life, ‘It is Christ, not reason, that makes the believer free’. 
Here, in Christ, was ‘at once the limitation, and also the justification, of all our efforts to 
exhibit the intelligibility of our creed’.25 ‘It was precisely this seriousness about Christology 
that Green’s immanentism would not allow him’. ‘He saw that the coming of Christ broke 
up… the… little world… fashioned after the image of… passing idealism’.26  
For Holland, of course, this meant that the ‘example of Christ’s Cross’ was ‘not some 
imaginary, speculative, airy-natured offering’.27 The sermons collected in On Behalf of Belief 
– published the same year as Lux Mundi (1889) – were equally anti-idealist. Here, Holland 
was concerned to ‘dispel the mists of a shifty, idealistic treatment’ of the resurrection. The 
resurrection of Christ was ‘no idea, but a fact; no spiritual ideal, but an actual event… in a 
sense directly contrary to that of the idealists’.28 To the philosopher, this was a hard doctrine: 
the gospel of Christ was foolishness to the Greeks (1 Cor. 1:23). Yet the impossibility of 
Christianity was made possible by grace of the Holy Spirit: ‘we cannot believe it of 
ourselves; we cannot argue ourselves into it. Through the Spirit alone is faith made possible 
to us’.29 
                                                     
24 MacKinnon, ‘Scott Holland and Contemporary Needs’, p.110 and p. 117. 
25 Holland, Logic and Life, p. xi. 
26 MacKinnon, ‘Scott Holland and Contemporary Needs’, p. 113 and p. 116. The point is accentuated if 
Holland’s sermons are compared with Nettleship’s notes on ‘The Atonement’ (in Philosophical Lectures and 
Remains, vol. 1, pp. 39-42). Here, over-confident idealist speculation arguably trivializes the hard facts – the 
tragedies – of real moral experience. The contrast between Holland’s theologia crucis and Nettleship’s 
speculative theorizing shows how Holland’s approach to religious problems – if one allows one brief allusion to 
Collingwood that Collingwood himself would probably not allow – provided a necessary via purgativa of the 
idealist mind (cf. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924), p. 146). 
27 Holland, Logic and Life, p. 138. 
28 Holland, On Behalf of Belief (London: Rivingtons, 1889), p. 3. 





Holland’s obstinate theological realism would hardly convince anyone on rationalist grounds. 
It was not meant to. The foundation of faith was Christ alone; the authentication of faith was 
revelation alone – the act of the living God in Christ. Holland’s ultimate position on 
theological epistemology – set forth in his sermon, ‘The Witness of Christ’ in Pleas and 
Claims (1892) – was this: ‘the deed done in Christ had this about it to confirm its 
authenticity, that it swept away the cloud that had hung over the face of God’. Holland 
regarded ‘the fact and the evidence for the fact as inseparable from one another’. The 
‘Christian fact’ was one which made ‘witness to itself’, ‘as of a living thing’.30 Belief in 
Christ was, in other words, something thrust upon the believer, carrying with it an 
unconditional mysterious self-authentication. The mystery of Christ was at once inescapable 
and inexplicable. 
Earlier in this essay, I referred to MacKinnon’s remarks on Kant’s discovery of the 
authority of conscience, represented as something which could only be ‘presented through 
tortuous and strenuous argument’. MacKinnon drew attention to the idea that this was 
something which ‘includes at its centre the recognition that what we have discovered we can 
neither represent nor, indeed, rest in recognition of its unrepresentability’.31 The formal 
parallels between Holland’s encounter with Christ and Kant’s encounter with conscience 
should be apparent, and in this part of the argument I will assume that MacKinnon’s own 
discussion of Holland’s debts to Kantianism is broadly correct – viz., that Holland’s move 
away from idealism towards Christological realism was enabled (intellectually, if not 
                                                     
30 Holland, Pleas and Claims for Christ (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892), p. 82, p. 73, and p. 77. 
31 MacKinnon, The Problem of Metaphysics, p. 66. 
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spiritually) by a theological appropriation of elements of Kant’s work.32 For present purposes 
it is more pressing to explore Holland’s differences to Green, and here one comes to the crux 
of the matter. MacKinnon saw in Green, too, a similar debt to Kant – less developed, less 
prominent, yet still present. ‘For Green there was a real problem of knowledge. Something 
mysterious in the structure of the thing… Green learnt from Kant the presence in experience, 
whether cognative or conative, of an irreducible complexity’.33 The question then arises, how 
does Green’s supposed recognition of ‘something mysterious’ in the structure of 
epistemology contrast with Holland’s more explicit recognition of Christological mystery? 
To answer this question it is useful to turn to Mander’s recent discussion of British 
Idealism and poetry. This is not because Mander deals with the positive connections between 
religion and poetry and philosophy in an illuminating fashion (he does not), but rather 
because his discussion helpfully draws out what I think are the crucial issues in Green’s 
writings with reference to Kant. In the course of a description of Analytic philosophers’ 
unease with the Idealists’ literary style, Mander lets fall the following sentence: ‘it was 
objected that the Idealists had a very odd way of speaking, that they used words in mysterious 
ways’. The Idealists, according to Mander, ‘did not use… ordinary language… not out of 
some perverse desire to confuse, but because they simply did not believe that reality could 
ever be accessed in that way’. Mander continues: ‘ordinary language comes from ordinary 
experience and… for the Idealists, reality was something hidden, something quite other than 
ordinary experience’. 34 
Green is basically a Kantian – his eternal consciousness is understood as that which 
supplies the categories by which we unify and structure our experience, as that which 
                                                     
32 See MacKinnon, ‘Aspects of Kant’s Influence on British Theology’ in MacDonald Ross and McWalter (eds), 
Kant and His Influence (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 348-66, esp. p. 359. 
33 MacKinnon, ‘The Victorian attitude to Evil and Personal Responsibility’, in Grisewood (ed.), Ideas and 
Beliefs of the Victorians (London: Sylvan Press, 1949), pp. 139-49, here citing p. 144. 
34 W. Mander, British Idealism: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 350.  
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makes it possible. But just like Kant before him, this puts Green in an impossible 
dilemma, for if what he says is true he cannot say it. The problem is that the concepts 
and structures apply only within experience, and cannot legitimately be used outside 
or beyond it, not even to express the conditions which make possible that experience 
itself. What makes thought possible cannot itself be thought. We find a similar 
problem in F. H. Bradley. The relational mode of thought is contradictory and points 
beyond itself. But all thinking is inevitably relational, and so we must conclude that it 
too points beyond itself – thought’s ‘happy suicide’ – to an Absolute reality in some 
fashion felt but never said.35  
 As illustration, Mander points to Green’s Prolegomena § 75: ‘In speaking of this 
principle we can only use the terms we have got; and these, being all strictly appropriate to 
relations, which this principle renders possible but under which it does not itself subsist, are 
strictly inappropriate to it’. Now, in theological perspective, Green here puts his finger on the 
central problem of apophaticism, of the via negativa. Green’s ‘principle’ transcended 
language, and although he writes in Prolegomena §54 that he found it ‘generally desirable to 
avoid’ ‘the use of theological language’, it should be recognised that he nevertheless found 
himself there compelled to use it in order to communicate what he meant.36 (Remember, 
Nettleship concluded his ‘Memoir’ of Green by quoting Tennyson’s ‘Holy Grail’: ‘Ask me 
not, for I may not speak of it; | I saw it’). 37 Two critical issues arise from this. 
First, if the hidden, transcendent principle of Green’s philosophy is impenetrable and 
mysterious, inaccessible to thought, “felt but never said”, can it really be held that the 
epistemological foundation of his philosophy is any more or any less secure than that of 
                                                     
35 W. Mander, British Idealism, p. 350.  
36.T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, fourth edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899). 
37 Nettleship, ‘Memoir’, in Works of Thomas Hill Green, vol. 3 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888), 
here citing, p. clxi. 
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Holland’s theology? At least Holland’s belief in Christ was experienced as something thrust 
upon him, carrying with it a mysterious self-authentication – the living Christ making vital 
witness to himself.38 If both Green and Holland in different ways invoked mystery, by what 
rational means might one decide between them? And if the decision is finally pre-rational or 
supra-rational, by what means might Holland’s Christian faith be demonstrated as rationally 
invalid? When constructed in this way, such questions may well be unanswerable in rational 
argument, so I will proceed to the next critical point. 
Secondly, what happens to language in this situation? Mander tells us that if what 
Green says is true, he cannot say it. At this point, I want to return to Geoffrey Hill’s essay, 
‘“Perplexed Persistence”: The Exemplary Failure of T. H. Green’, in order to say something 
more about the ethical virtue – the sacrifice – of failed communication. Now, in Hill’s essay, 
it should be recalled, Green’s handling of the problem of ineffability is used as an interpretive 
context for a suggestive reading of Hopkins’ ethical activity as a poet: an intelligent 
engagement with conceptions of the unsayable opens up philosophical, theological and moral 
approaches to poetic creation. 
The importance of the philosophy of language in Green’s teaching should not be 
underestimated for there is direct evidence that concerns with language and literature played 
a principle role in discussions with Balliol students in the 1860s. Thus, according to A. C. 
Bradley, ‘Green suggested to [Nettleship] in early days that he might approach philosophy 
                                                     
38 This, of course, is to say that the Christian theologian remains open to the freedom of God’s grace, i.e., that 
type of supernatural co-operation that is positively and definitively denied in Green’s “New Christianity”. Here 
Green departs from Kant. For Kant the possibility of the supernatural and free action of God was incapable of 
denial; it was, rather, unsayable, gestured towards through the use of a double negative. (See Kant Religion 
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6:191, in Religion and Rational Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 207). If Holland and Hopkins held theological realist positions and realised that they 
could only express such belief in language obliquely – as witnesses to the mysterious and unsayable ineffability 
of God’s grace – this only located them within the scope of this aspect of Kantianism. Green, by contrast, was 
more of a deist than Kant. See R. Norman, ‘The Christologies of Kant and the British Idealists’ in Collingwood 
and British Idealism Studies, 19:1 (2013), pp. 113-137. 
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from the side of language’.39 As Nettleship’s reflections grew to fruition, he intuited that 
poetry was somehow akin to metaphysics. As he explained in a letter to Mrs Green dated 
November, 1874, words ‘of poetry’ provided an example of ‘material media’ through which 
‘unification’ of ‘self’ with ‘truth, beauty, or goodness’ could be realised. In this letter, 
‘poetry’ was likened to ‘active self-sacrifice’, as both provided instances of the actualisation 
of metaphysical reality – the eternal law of sacrifice. Poetry provided an instance of sacrifice 
when an individual was ‘wholly taken up into the beauty of it’, just as one might be 
kenotically ‘emptied into the act’ of doing good. ‘So that it seems as if to “realize” (in this 
sense) ought to mean literally to “be the thing,” and that words, whether of poetry or of logic, 
are one of the material media through which this unification of subject and object takes 
place’. Such ‘unification’ was, according to Nettleship, equivalent to ‘self-obliteration’.40  
This approach was sketched out in the Section III of Nettleship’s ‘Lectures on Logic’, 
entitled ‘Language and Its Function in Knowledge’. Here we find Nettleship’s belief that 
words were in some sense capable of approaching ontological concretion: ‘One should 
beware of the antithesis of words and things; it really is a distinction between the less full and 
the more full meanings of words’. Language had a formative role in the development of self-
knowledge, for ‘the consciousness which we express when we have found the “right word” is 
not the same as our consciousness before we found it; so that it is not strictly correct to call 
the word the expression of what we meant before we found it’. Further, language had a role 
in knowledge of external objects and subjects: ‘Again, the old crux, “How can I be sure that I 
mean the same as the other person?” is in principle the same as the difficultly, “How can I 
know that anything corresponds to my sensations?”’.41 As poetic language was potentially an 
                                                     
39 Nettleship, Lectures and Remains, vol. 1, p. l, n. 2. 
40 Nettleship, Lectures and Remains, vol. 1, pp. 53-4.  
41 Nettleship, Lectures and Remains, vol. 1, p. 134, p. 130, and p. 136. 
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act of kenotic self-sacrifice, Nettleship’s use of the word “crux” carries a weight of 
theological association. 
One can read Green’s thoughts on the relation of ethics to literature in the 
Prolegomena, § 148: ‘The effect of “moral” interests appears in habits without which the 
scholar or artist is not properly free for his work, nor exempt from the temptation to be showy 
instead of thorough in it’. There were, in other words, ethical motivations for literary 
repression, restraint or reserve. As reserve for the sake of rigour and accuracy could function 
as a mark of morality informing communication, so difficulty, obscurity even, could be 
virtuous if it led to thoroughness. Since Green could, when it suited him, be lucid, Hill 
detected here what he called a ‘form of vocational renunciation’, a mark of humility.42 To 
press the point, one might well consider a remark of Green’s (not mentioned by Hill): ‘social 
life is to personality what language is to thought’ (Prolegomena, § 183). Language was 
analogous to social phenomenon, and – granted Green’s metaphysics of sacrifice –implied a 
giving-away of the self for the sake of the community. Something was always sacrificed in 
language. 
 To clarify his argument, Hill drew a comparison with Mill’s observations on the 
politics of language: ‘Mankind have many ideas, and a few words. Two consequences follow 
from it; one that a certain laxity in the use of language must be borne with, if a writer makes 
himself understood; the other that, to understand a writer who uses the same words as a 
vehicle for different ideas, requires a vigorous effort of co-operation on the part of the 
reader’.43 The dilemma here, according to Hill, was between ‘two forms of sacrifice: sacrifice 
of [clear communication] and sacrifice to [communicate]’.44 On the one hand, clarity of 
                                                     
42 Hill, ‘“Perplexed Persistence”’, p. 110. 
43 Hill’s source here is Mill’s ‘Review of Use and Abuse of Political Terms’, Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine, 1 
(1832), p. 299, cited in Davies and Watson, The English Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 
p. 233 
44 Hill, ‘“Perplexed Persistence”’, p. 94. 
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expression meant imprecision of communication (as the reader imagined they understood 
what was meant too-easily and missed the writer’s meaning); on the other, a deliberate 
obscurity invited the reader to pay patient attentiveness to a text, to strenuously co-operate in 
the discipline required for thorough communication.  
According to Nettleship, Green at one point advocated the practise of literary 
asceticism. He ‘had a theory in composing… that all superfluous words should be extirpated, 
the fewest and most compressed used: that, if possible, an essay should consist of one single 
indivisible paragraph, the connected expression of a single proposition or a single syllogism’. 
For unsympathetic readers, his prose style could appear ‘difficult, laborious, or clumsy’, yet it 
also contained ‘an underglow of subdued eloquence’. In Nettleship’s own view, ‘Of all 
occupations writing was to him at once the hardest and most absorbing; and because it was so 
hard and absorbing, it gathered into itself more of his massive, struggling personality than 
any other kind of work’. Green’s style was ‘the man himself in words’.45 
The implication was that the obscurity of Green’s lectures was deliberate, and Hill 
drew on Nettleship, Ashton, and Farnell to elucidate the idea. 
Though he had great difficulty in expressing himself at that time… Everyone saw that 
there was great substantial value and originality in the work; and the very difficulty of 
his utterance gave one the feeling that he was working the thing out, and not repeating 
other people’s phrases or ideas… The men in fact took a sort of pride in the difficult 
process which he went through before he got things clear, as if it were in some way 
the joint action of us all.46 
                                                     
45 Nettleship, ‘Memoir’, p. xxxviii. 
46 Nettleship, ‘Memoir’, pp. lxiv-lxv. 
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I had the privilege of taking a few essays to Mr. Green… I went to his home with my 
work, and he used to sit over the fire, “tying himself into knots”. He beat out his 
music with some difficulty, and the music itself was not an ordinary melody. I once 
said I was afraid that some phrase of mine was not very clear. “I am afraid,” he said 
with a rueful smile, “that in philosophy clearness of thought is often in inverse 
proportion to clearness of expression”.47  
I… followed his remarkable lectures with enthusiasm and tense strain… I can 
remember that I did not understand a single word as I wrote down the perplexing 
tangle of phrases furiously and at lightning-speed: then in the quiet of my rooms I 
brooded over them till light seemed to gleam from the written word.48 
Hill recognised the associative echoes: ‘Among the words that figure prominently in this and 
the previously quoted student-memoir are “music”, “perplexing” and “gleam”, three key-
words in “Tintern Abbey”’.49 Green’s students, he hinted, responded to him in the vocabulary 
of Wordsworth’s poetry. 
Hill also held the ‘subjective impression’ that there was ‘some analogy between the 
method and effect of Hopkins’s poem[s] and the method and effect of Green’s lectures’.50 At 
the very least, it ought to be admitted that what Nettleship had said about Green’s lectures 
could equally apply to Hopkins’ poetry: ‘the very difficulty of his utterance gave one the 
feeling that he was working the thing out, and not repeating other people’s phrases or ideas’. 
What Hill sensed, though, was something more: that the difficulty of Hopkins’ poetry 
                                                     
47 A. J. Ashton, As I Went on My Way (London, 1924), p. 61; cited in M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 162. 
48 L. R. Farnell, An Oxonian Looks Back (London, 1934), pp. 44-5; cited in Richter, Politics of Conscience, p. 
14. 
49 Hill, ‘“Perplexed Persistence”’, p. 113. 
50 Hill, ‘“Perplexed Persistence”’, p. 113. 
20 
 
reproduced the ethical asceticism and sacrifice of Green’s philosophy of language. In support, 
Hill cited Hopkins’ letter to Bridges dated 6 November 1887: 
Plainly if it is possible to express a sub[t]le and recondite thought on a subtle and 
recondite subject in a subtle and recondite way and with great felicity and perfection, 
in the end, something must be sacrificed, with so trying a task, in the process, and this 
may be the being at once, nay perhaps even the being without explanation at all, 
intelligible.51  
For Hopkins, of course, such talk of the sacrifice in language could hardly escape 
association with Christ crucified: the ethics of Christ the Word informed the ethics of how 
one might use words. When, as a mature poet, Hopkins began to ‘castigate his art into a more 
reserved style’, a Christian ascetic discipline focussed and concentrated his writing.52 In 
Oxford in 1879, Hopkins had preached on the centrality of Christ’s sacrifice: ‘Religion is the 
highest of the moral virtues and sacrifice the highest act of religion. Also self sacrifice is the 
purest charity. Christ was the most religious of men, to offer sacrifice was the chief purpose 
of his life and that the sacrifice of himself’.53 Hopkins’ ‘Christocentric aesthetics’, then, has 
something in common with Holland’s Christological correction of Green: Green’s idealist 
and literary theory of kenosis was here, in sermons and poetry, baptised into the real and 
living mystery of Christ crucified.54  
  When Holland stated that Green ‘gave us back the language of self-sacrifice’, it was 
in an important sense just that – language. For, as Holland realised, that which was learnt 
                                                     
51 Hopkins, Letters to Bridges, pp. 265-66; cited in Hill, ‘“Perplexed Persistence”’, p. 94. 
52 Robert Bridges, ‘Preface to Notes’ in Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1918), p. 99. See also F. R. Leavis, 
New Bearings in English Poetry (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 139. 
53 Hopkins, Sermons and Devotional Writings, p. 14. 
54 On Hopkins’ Christocentrism, see R. Cronin, Reading Victorian Poetry (Chichester: John Wiley, 2012), p. 
169. See further P. A. Ballinger, The Poem as Sacrament: The Theological Aesthetic of Gerard Manley Hopkins 
(Louvain: Peeters, 2000), pp. 79ff. 
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from Green, or Ruskin, or even Marx, nevertheless had to be fused with ‘our own Christian 
language’, the language of Sacraments, of belief in Word made flesh, ‘in the depth and 
intensity of significance disclosed by faith in the Incarnation’.55 
 
IV 
Holland once stated that ‘Green was cruelly inarticulate: and his message was tough and 
tangled: and the Hegelian jargon was teeth-breaking, and head-splitting: and the way of 
speculation was hard and grim to tread’. Examination of the context of this statement shows 
that Holland thought it a mark of strenuous thought that it was ‘not easy or cheap’. A 
properly philosophical style ‘did not keep to the surface’, but ‘went down to the deep’. There 
was a risk (which Holland here associated with Illingworth), that too much lucidity could 
hinder understanding: ‘men… thought that they understood much more than they had actually 
mastered’.56 Earlier, in a different context (in this case a review of Hobson’s book on Ruskin 
dated 1898), Holland had made the point well: 
The world is so easily taken in by logical lucidity. Its obvious clearness seems to 
prove itself. No effort is needed… In reality… no logic that goes to the heart of things 
is likely to look very lucid, and will never appear plain to the plain man. Things are 
very difficult; and their secret will never be secured without effort and struggle. 
Philosophy is bound to be a very tough job.57  
                                                     
55 Holland, The Philosophy of Faith and The Fourth Gospel (London: John Murray, 1920), pp. 10-12. 
56 Holland in A. L. Illingworth, ed., Life of Illingworth (London: John Murray, 1917), pp. 316-17. 
57 Holland, Personal Studies (London: Wells, Gardner, Darton and Co., 1905), pp. 63-4. 
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In the review, Holland promoted Hobson’s notion that readers thought less of Ruskin 
because he was too clear. It was necessary to combat the view ‘that a man like Ruskin, who 
writes well, cannot think clearly or deeply’.58  
 How did the risks of intellectual clarity and obscurity, rhetorical ease and difficulty, 
emerge in Holland’s own work?  
Christopher Cheshire recalled of Holland’s jounalism that ‘we all somehow felt that 
as long as Holland kept writing away in that peculiar style of his the wind was moving in the 
tree-tops, [and] we were being kept sweet and clean’.59 In his own account of sermon-style, 
Holland argued that the spoken word needed spontaneity, ‘in immediate contact with the 
condition of its delivery’. Only thus could a sermon achieve its necessary ‘freshness’ and 
‘fire’: ‘Otherwise it becomes an essay, not a sermon; it passes out of the conditions of 
oratory’. ‘No doubt, to say this is to make Sermons incapable, except in the very rarest 
instances, of the highest literary excellence’.60  
Reservations over Holland’s style were captured by Charles Gore in his contribution 
to Stephen Paget’s biography. Although Gore recollected Holland’s ‘brilliant oratory’, his 
rhetoric had been called by others ‘fireworks’.61 So, too, Edward Stuart Talbot drew attention 
to the problem of Holland’s style: 
I always felt that his distinctive mental gift was intellectual imagination. It gave its 
character to his thought; still more to his expression of it. It made his style, both in 
quality and its defect. He saw everything vividly, in the concrete, flowing out into 
consequences, wrapping itself in clothing of form and colour. It was intellectual 
                                                     
58 Holland, Personal Studies, p. 62, referring to J. A. Hobson, John Ruskin: Social Reformer (London: James 
Nisbet, 1898), p. vii. 
59 Cheshire, ‘Introduction’ in Holland, Creeds and Critics (London: Mowbray, 1918), pp. ix-x. 
60 Holland, Logic and Life, p. xiv. 
61 Paget, Scott Holland, pp. 248-49. 
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poetry. No doubt this baffled some minds: its rapidity and flow distracted them: they 
were outrun by his nimbleness: they wanted to stop and ask what was the sterling 
value of the thought. He was too rhetorical for them… Perhaps he was better to hear 
than to read.62  
Some found Holland’s style was ‘florid’.63 Others referred to his ‘torrential 
eloquence’.64 Talbot wrote of his ‘abundant phrasing, like the delicate numberless touches of 
the artist on the canvas’. He argued that it achieved ‘fullness of effect, gained by richness and 
accurate delicacy of delineation’.65 G. W. E. Russell took a different view: 
He played strange tricks with the English language, heaped words upon words, strung 
adjective to adjective; mingled passages of Ruskinesque description with jerky 
fragments of modern slang… whereas most of us can restrain ourselves better on 
paper than when we are speaking, his pen ran away with him when he was writing a 
sermon, but on a platform he could keep his natural fluency in bounds. 66 
Russell suggested that Holland ‘might have revealed himself more easily in music 
than in speech’, and, in an effort to make sense of Holland’s style quoted the teaching of 
Newman’s Parochial and Plain Sermons: ‘Earthly words are indeed all worthless to minister 
to such high anticipations’ – ‘Let us close our eyes and keep silence’.67  
 
                                                     
62 Talbot, in Cheshire, ed., Some Appreciations, pp. 2-3. Paget, also insisted that the sermons were meant to be 
heard. They were performance pieces: ‘the word, in print, is nothing: but when he spoke it, he could make it as 
effective as the knocking at the door in Macbeth’ (Paget, pp. 157-58).   
63 The Spectator, 7 June, 1919, p. 734. 
64 Charles Smyth, The Art of Preaching (London: SPCK, 1940), p. 234; MacKinnon, ‘Scott Holland and 
Contemporary Needs’, p. 105. 
65 Talbot, in Cheshire, ed., Some Appreciations, pp. 3-4. 
66 Russell, in Some Appreciations, pp. 82-3. 





The attentive reader of Holland’s published works will see that he repeatedly referred to 
Wordsworth when seeking to find expression for human notions of transcendence. On one 
level, this means that Holland was engaged in the public performance of romanticism in late-
Victorian England, drawing on reference points familiar to his intended audience. But it is 
also suggestive of a particular debt to Green, who regarded Wordsworth’s ‘Ode to duty’ as 
‘the high-water-mark of modern poetry’. According to Nettleship, Green viewed Wordsworth 
as a ‘contemplative’ poet who had offered a ‘deeper’ vision of things than that afforded by 
materialism.68 The poet was taken to have moved beyond ‘the fingering of sensations’ to 
arrive at consciousness of ‘an ideal’, that was, ultimately, ineffable and inexpressible. This, 
argued Green in an essay published in March, 1868, was the true value of Wordsworth’s 
work: he showed that ‘nature was something more to man than nature would herself 
explain’.69  Evidently, Green held up Wordsworth as an example of unsophisticated idealism 
and pressed the idea on his students. The result in Holland’s case, was far-reaching. In 
particular, Wordsworth’s ‘Elegaic Stanzas, suggested by a picture of Peele Castle’ seems to 
have lodged in his mind: ‘add the gleam | The light that never was, on sea or land, | The 
consecration, and the poet’s dream’. ‘Gleam’ was a word often used by Holland; the line 
‘The light that never was, on sea or land’, was, it seems, never far from him.70 ‘Christianity’ 
                                                     
68 Nettleship, ‘Memoir’, xviii and lxxiv; 
69 Green, ‘Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life’ in Works, vol. 3, pp. 92-125, here citing pp. 118-19. 
70 Thus Holland, ‘Follow in Gleam’ in Vital Values (London: Wells, Gardner, Darton and Co., 1906), p. 24. For 
further examples of Holland using the phrase ‘light that never was on land or sea’, see ‘Mission of the Oxford 
Movement’ in Personal Studies, p. 79 and p. 93; ‘Church and State’, in Gore, ed. Essays on Church Reform 
(London: John Murray, 1898), p. 113. For ‘sea still gleaming’ see Logic and Life, 145.  
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he wrote, was ‘the very heart of all Romance… a visionary gleam: an outbreak, a passion, a 
defiance, a revolt’.71  
Holland’s one substantial public statement on poetry was made in a thirty-page-long 
preface to a new edition of the Lyra Apostolica (1901), later reproduced in Personal Studies 
(1905).72 The essay has its own worth. If Holland had offered no more than a restatement of 
the old Tractarian beliefs that ‘Nature was the symbolic utterance of the unseen God’, that 
‘The world was sacramental’, and that ‘poets… shed the gleam of consecration upon land and 
sea’, then he would have added little or nothing to Keble’s own exhaustive lectures on poetry 
and ‘penetrating studies of the Imagination’, to Keble’s acknowledgement of debts to 
Wordsworth’s vision, or to Newman’s sweeping remark of April, 1836: ‘Poetry then is our 
mysticism’.73 But Holland had more to say than that. The picture that emerges is less what the 
Lyra Apostolica had been in the 1830s, than what it became in the 1860s. In particular, his 
vocabulary suggests that he was writing about the poems of the Lyra Apostolica with T. H. 
Green in mind, leaving behind a trace or memory of things said at Balliol when he had been a 
student. So much, at least, is suggested by what he said about Newman’s ‘The Watchmen’, 
‘with its splendid swing’.74 Swing was a Greenianism: ‘Swing’, recalled Nettleship, was a 
favourite word with him [Green] to describe the movement of native eloquence… he would 
                                                     
71 Holland, Vital Values, p. 31. 
72 The edition was edited by Henry Charles Beeching (1859-1919). Beeching had studied at Balliol from 1878, 
was ordained in 1882, and proceeded to become Rector of Yattendon (the home of Robert Bridges) from 1885-
1900. In the summer of 1887, Hopkins visited Bridges at Yattendon and met Beeching (see Hopkins’ letter to 
Bridges, August 25th, 1887); Hopkins and Bridges discussed the essay on Milton which the latter was then 
writing for Beeching’s edition of Paradise Lost. The next year, Bridges’ daughter, Elizabeth, was baptised by 
Beeching in the parish church (see Hopkins’ letter to Bridges, 12th January, 1888). In 1890, Beeching married 
Bridges’ niece, Mary Plow. From 1901, he was Professor of Pastoral Theology at King’s College, London. 
Shortly afterwards, he edited the new edition of the Lyra Apostolica in Methuen’s Library of Devotion series, 
with an introduction by Holland.  
73 For standard remarks on Tractarian poetry and sacramentalism, see Holland, ‘Mission of the Oxford 
Movement’, pp. 92-3. For Keble’s ‘studies of the Imagination’, see p. 79. For Newman on poetry and 
mysticism, see his ‘Prospects of the Anglican Church’, originally published in the British Critic, April, 1839, 
and reproduced in J. H. Newman, Essays Critical and Historical, vol. 1 (London: Pickering, 1881), pp. 263-307, 
especially pp. 290-91. For background discussion, see M. Johnson, Gerard Manley Hopkins and Tractarian 
Poetry, p. 19ff. 
74 Holland, ‘Mission of the Oxford Movement’, p. 70. 
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express his dissatisfaction with much contemporary English poetry by saying, with a 
characteristic gesture of the hand, “There is no swing in it”’.75 If Newman swung splendidly, 
as Holland claimed he did, he fulfilled the throwaway, unreflective, rhythmical criteria that 
Green had pressed on his students.  
In Holland’s essay, then, we may glimpse the trace of a young Greenian’s encounter 
with the Lyra Apostolica in the 1860s. From the beginning, Holland stressed ‘the temper with 
which the book tingles from cover to cover’, and described it as one of ‘articulate defiance’ – 
a defiance that might have matched his own, later, defiance of Green. This temper of defiance 
was, he said, touched with confidence, for the Lyra Apostolica was primarily a romance, 
‘such as belongs to young souls who have let themselves go under the inspiration of a high 
adventure’.76 In retrospect, Holland’s emphasis on the romantic character of the Lyra 
Apostolica is striking: he seems to have simply assumed that this was how the book should be 
read, located within the Victorian chivalric revival alongside William Morris’ The Defence of 
Guenevere and Other Poems (1858), and Tennyson’s Idylls of the King (1859 onwards).77 
Perhaps it should be unsurprising that Holland viewed the Lyra Apostolica of 1836 as 
standing squarely in the tradition of the chivalric revival. But for all that Keble’s ‘The Vigil’ 
exemplified Christian chivalry, and guaranteed the collection a place in the trajectory 
reaching from Scott to Tennyson, there is no question that Holland over-emphasised this 
aspect of the book. For, in his introduction, Holland dwelt on chivalry rather too much, 
reckoning it the dominant characteristic of the Lyra Apostolica. Newman, Keble, Froude, 
Williams, Wilberforce, and Bowden had become, in his reading, ‘friends set out on a high 
venture in an hour of peril and distress’. ‘They were held together by all the glowing 
                                                     
75 Nettleship, ‘Memoir’, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii. 
76 Holland, ‘The Mission of the Oxford Movement’, p. 67 and p. 70. 
77 For Holland’s appropriation of Tennyson’s ‘Merlin and the Gleam’ (1889), see his Epiphanytide sermon, 
‘Follow the Gleam’ in Vital Values, pp. 24-35. 
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confidence which belongs to a chivalrous company, who have sworn themselves to a cause 
which they will serve unto death’.78 
It has been argued that the proliferation of chivalric themes in ‘a culture that set great 
store by restrained self-denial’ may be accounted for with reference to Freudian or Lacanian 
analyses of repression and sublimation.79 But Holland provided a Christian account of such 
themes when he made the straightforward observation: ‘Chivalry is ascetic’. He was explicit 
that ‘poem after poem of Newman’s turns on the self-repression which is the essential note of 
every true soldier of God. Not only do the lower desires need to be brought severely under 
rule, but the purest and highest instincts fall under the punishing rod and the purging fire’. 
‘All life of the soul is won through restraint, through repression, through austere law’. 80 If 
Holland could discern these qualities in Newman’s poems, so too could Hopkins, who, when 
developing a Christocentric aesthetics, ‘castigate[d] his art into a more reserved style’. Where 
Hopkins was drawn to chivalric asceticism in ‘The Windhover’ – ‘Oh my chevalier!’, 
‘dauphin… Falcon… off forth on swing… valour… pride, plume’ – the imaginary vision 
was, one feels, inspired by the Lyra Apostolica, viewed through an ascetic Pre-Raphaelite 
lens, set in motion, potentially, by the requisite Greenian ‘swing’.  
 
VI 
Mander has suggested that in the late Victorian period, ‘religion in many people’s 
eyes had failed’. Moreover, ‘poetry’ was ‘taking over where theology had failed’.81 For some 
                                                     
78 Holland, ‘The Mission of the Oxford Movement’, p. 94. The closest approximation to such sentiments in 
Newman is in the latter’s approval of ‘the poetry and romance of the moderns… cultivated and cherished in our 
later times by the Cavaliers and Tories’. See Newman, Essays Critical and Historical, vol. 1, p. 291. 
79 See Saville, A Queer Chivalry, p. 24-5 
80 Holland, ‘The Mission of the Oxford Movement’ pp. 71-2, and p. 91. 
81 Mander, British Idealism: A History, pp. 342-43. 
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students of Green this was true. For others it was not true. Not least among the latter group 
was Hopkins himself (‘for our time and the future, the only influential poet of the Victorian 
age, and… the greatest’).82 Hopkins’ development of a Christocentric aesthetics and 
asceticism, it should be understood, allowed him to flourish as a poet. For Hopkins and for 
Holland, it was rather Green’s philosophy that had failed – had reached a point of silence. Yet 
this was for them, as Hill recognised, an exemplary failure – a failure marked by the ethics of 
sacrifice. Green ‘gave us back the language of self-sacrifice, and taught us how we belonged 
to one another in the one life of organic humanity’, wrote Holland. If Green remained 
suspicious of ‘institutions of ascetic co-operation’, he nevertheless knew the importance of 
the principle of self-sacrifice. It was just that his vision of sacrifice was narrower in scope 
than that of his Christian students: it was thoroughly immanent and lacked a living 
transcendent dimension. Two lines of ‘ascetic co-operation’ here cross: a horizontal axis of 
co-operative social sacrifice (that Green allowed), and a vertical axis of Christ’s co-operative 
sacrifice, the work of co-operative grace (that Green would not allow).  In Green’s idealist 
reduction of Christianity, ‘we are left to ourselves’ in the silence. 83  In Holland’s sermons, 
that silence was answered – paradoxically – in broken words, by the Word made flesh. ‘Ask 
me not, for I may not speak of it; | I saw it’.  
 
 
                                                     
82 Leavis, New Bearings in English Poetry, p. 142. 
83 T. H. Green, ‘The Witness of God’, p. 244. 
